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INTRODUCTION
n 1892, the Richmond & West Point Terminal Railway and Warehouse Co., along with several of its subsidiaries, defaulted on interest obligations, and the president of the company, John H. Inman, was appointed its receiver. During the next two years, two factions vied for control of the company, one representing the incumbent owners, directors and managers, and the other representing prospective ownership organized by the investment banking house of J.P. Morgan (Daggart, 1908; Klein, 1970) . The Terminal Co. responded by acquiring another 41 percent of the stock of the R&D, bringing its total stake in the R&D to 51 percent. The Terminal Co. raised the necessary funds by issuing new preferred and common stock. During the contest for control of the R&D, the market value of its stock was raised temporarily to $200 per share (as compared to its par value of $100 per share). After it gained control of the R&D, the Terminal Co. acquired almost all the remaining stock of the R&D, thereby consolidating its control over the system (see Figure 3 ).
During the next few years, the Terminal Co. conducted an ambitious program of expansion by acquisition. In 1887, the company acquired control of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Ry, about 1,600 miles in length, shortly following its reorganization. The East Tennessee generally operated on the west slope of the Appalachian Mountains, roughly parallel to the R&D, from Bristol, TN, to Mobile, AL, with a line to the Atlantic Ocean from Macon, GA, to Brunswick, GA. In 1888, the Terminal Co. acquired control of the Central RR of Georgia, about 2,300 miles in length, mostly operating within the state of Georgia. Together with other acquisitions, by 1889, the Terminal Co. was operating one of the largest railroad systems in the country (see the following chart). Consolidating its control over the R&D, obtaining control over the East Tennessee and Central of Georgia systems, other acquisitions, and various improvements to its roads saddled the Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries with very large interest expense on bonds and rental expense on leased roads. Fortunately, through 1891, revenue and income of the Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries were generally rising, as is illustrated in the income statements of the R&D, shown in Tables 1 to 3 (Poor, 1884 (Poor, -1895 . Strength in revenue and income enabled the Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries to meet their heavy fixed expenses and as well as make dividend payments on at least some of the stocks of its subsidiaries, including the R&D in 1889.
By 1889, John H. Inman, originally of Georgia, had established himself as firmly in charge of the Terminal Co. He was president of both it and the R&D, and was joined on the boards of directors of the two companies by his brother Samuel Inman and several key northern capitalists, the most prominent of which was Jay Gould, "the scion of Wall Street." Mr. Inman had himself profited very handsomely from his control of the Terminal Co., having had a significant interest in the Central of Georgia at the time of its sale to the Terminal Co. To maintain his control over the vast system of roads encompassed by the Terminal Co., almost of Mr. Inman's personal wealth was invested in the junior securities of the Terminal Co., such as third mortgage bonds, income bonds, and preferred and common stocks, securities whose market values depended critically on the ability of the Terminal Co. and its subsidiaries to continue to grow its revenue and income. But, these securities could easily become worthless if a downturn in business forced the company to default on its obligations. (283,845) *when reported, otherwise included in other operating expenses. **this figure is simply the difference between fixed charges reported by the company and estimates of its rent and interest expenses based on its outstanding bonds and lease agreements. While revenue and income had been generally increasing for the Terminal Co. through the early 1890s, examination of the operating statistics of the R&D, shown in Table 3 , reveals a troubling development. While the physical volume of business (i.e., passengers-miles and freight ton-miles) was growing strongly, freight rates were on the decline, as eventually would be passenger rates. For reasons beyond the scope of this case, the country was experiencing a long, gradual deflation, making debt and other fixed-dollar obligations increasingly burdensome.
For a time, the Terminal Co. outpaced the deflation by expanding its physical volume of business and by reducing unit costs through productivity-increasing investments. Eventually, however, the deflation so burdened debtors -whether farmers, railroads or banks -that productivity growth was insufficient to prevent default. And, upon an uptick in defaults and widespread concern for the solvency of debtors, came the bank panics and financial crises characteristic of that time.
Not only the Terminal Co., but many other great and not so great railroads were forced into receiverships during the late 19 th century. Among these were the Baltimore & Ohio RR and Reading RR (two of the four railroads on the Monopoly game board), the Central Pacific RR and Union Pacific RR (which together formed the nation's first transcontinental railroad), the Norfolk & Western Railway, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe RR.
Typically, in railroad receiverships of the late 19 th century, a new company was organized to acquire the assets of the failed company, following a reorganization plan that respected the priority of claim of the securities that had been issued by the failed company (Hansen, 2000; Martin, 1974 ; Swain, 1898). (Some changes have occurred in corporate bankruptcies over the years; e.g., assessments are today rare.) During the time it took for the new company to be organized and for a proposed reorganization plan to be developed and gain sufficient acceptance by creditors, the railroad was operated by a court-appointed receiver, not unusually the president of the failed company. In most of these reorganizations:
Well-secured bonds of the failed company were simply assumed, undisturbed, by the new company.
2.
Intermediate securities might suffer a small loss, such as being exchanged for new securities that pay interest or dividends only if earned (e.g., income bonds, which pay interest only if the income of the company is sufficient).
3.
Some inferior securities might be exchanged for new securities only upon the payment of a cash assessment as was needed by the new company to restore the road and equipment inherited from the failed company to good working order, to pay interest arrears on well-secured bonds, and to pay the failed company's receiver's certificates and floating debt.
4.
Some inferior securities might be completely wiped out.
To illustrate, consider a small railroad company that had issued $1 million of 5 percent 1 st mortgage bonds, $1 million of 5 percent 2 nd mortgage bonds, and $1 million of stock, which had earnings of $75,000 per year (which amount would be insufficient to pay interest on both the 1 st and 2 nd mortgage bonds), and which had developed a floating debt of $100,000.
One possible reorganization plan for this company would be for a proposed new company to assume the failed company's 1 st mortgage bonds, and to offer $1,000 5 percent income bonds in the new company plus ten shares of stock in the new company, each having a par value of $100, for $100 cash plus $1,000 2 nd mortgage bonds of the failed company. Notice that, in this reorganization, the stock of the failed company would be wiped out.
Another possible reorganization plan would be for a proposed new company to assume the failed company's 1 st mortgage bonds (as in the first plan), to exchange $1,000 of 5 percent income bonds in the new company for $1,000 5 percent 2 nd mortgage bonds in the failed company, and to offer shares of stock in the new company, having a par value of $100 each, for $10 cash plus $100 par value of shares in the failed company, to the holders of the failed company's stock. Notice that, in this alternate reorganization, the stockholders of the failed company are not completely wiped out, but they do have to advance the cash necessary to pay off the floating debt of the failed company.
If the stockholders of the failed company believe that the revenue and income will recover, then paying the $10 per share assessment might appear to be attractive. With the assessment, they would "redeem" the company by paying off the floating debt, and -assuming that the revenue and income of the company do indeed recover -the company should be able to pay the full 5 percent interest on its new income bonds, and even pay dividends on its new stock.
The problem with this stockholder-friendly reorganization plan is that if the holders of the failed company's 2 nd mortgage bonds aren't satisfied with the exchange of their bonds for income bonds, they could make an alternative proposal, e.g., the first, in which they redeem the company. Generally, any class of creditors that would suffer a loss in a bankruptcy plan has the option of proposing a plan of its own. This motivates the directors and officers of the failed company, representing the interests of the shareholders of the failed company, to make an offer that treats all classes of creditors fairly, given their priorities of claim and a reasonable estimate of the company's earning power upon its reorganization. Table 4 details the claims structure of the R&D and its leased roads as of 1894. Direct obligations of the company amount to $18.9 million in debt and $5 million in equity. Indirect obligations of the company, the interest and dividend payments on which were all guaranteed as part of the leases involved, amount to another $12.6 million. 
MANAGEMENT'S PLAN
Mr. Inman was determined that, if possible, the shareholders would redeem the R&D, the strongest component of the Terminal Co., and the incumbent directors and officers would remain in place. Furthermore, if the R&D could be reorganized by management, it might be possible that most, if not all of the other roads in the system could be salvaged, preserving the fortunes of those who had invested heavily in the junior securities of the system (this would include preserving his own fortune). Unfortunately, the shareholders of the company had very little cash with which to redeem the company. A reorganization plan for the R&D required the following:
1.
$3 to 5 million in cash to pay off the receiver's certificates and reduce the company's working liabilities to a manageable level.
2.
Reduce the company's fixed charges by at least $300,000 so as to enable it to avoid another default if the depression were to continue.
The plan developed by management consisted, basically, of three parts: (1) Ten percent assessments on all classes of credit and on equity, in order to raise $3.5 million in cash; (2) Using the $3.5 million to pay off $1.7 million of receiver's certificates and reduce the company's working liabilities by $1.8 million; and, (3) converting the fixed interest and rent obligations on the third mortgage claims of the company and its leased roads into obligations contingent on the earnings of the company, thus reducing the company's fixed charges by a little more than $300,000 (see Table 5 ). By the 1890s, J.P. Morgan had established himself as the most powerful investment banker in the world. During that decade, he was instrumental in the reorganization of several large railroad systems, and even in helping the U.S. government maintain the gold standard. He later became associated with the organization of several large "trusts," or industrial monopolies, including U.S. Steel. Mr. Morgan seemed to enjoy both making money and using his wealth to pursue science, the arts, and beauty. His many benefactions include the Morgan collection of gems at the Metropolitan Museum of Natural History, and the founding of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. But, no matter how intelligent, witty, rich and powerful he was, he still had a big ugly nose.
The reorganization plan for the R&D proposed by management seemed to Mr. Morgan to both undervalue the earning ability of the railroad upon a turn-around of the economy, and impose too severe a loss to the bondholders of the company. Mr. Morgan was committed to the principle that bondholders were to be protected from risk in accordance with their priority of claim, and that railroads should be run for the benefit of all their stakeholders, paying good wages to workers, lowering fares to shippers, and making a good rate of return for their investors. His commitment to these principles gained for his banking house the trust of individual investors, insurance companies and banks in the advanced economies of the world, and enabled him to raise enormous amounts of money on reasonable terms.
In looking at a company like the R&D, having an immediate need for a substantial amount of cash, Mr. Morgan could consider the possibility of raising funds by the sale of stock in the new company at a price reflecting reasonable estimates of the future earnings of the company assuming economic recovery.
Indeed, this is exactly what Mr. Morgan wants you to help him with. He wants you to develop an alternative reorganization plan to be put forward on behalf of the several classes of bondholders of the company. In this alternative plan, the cash needed to reorganize the company is to come from wiping out the stock of the failed company, and selling stock in the new company to a syndicate of investors. Remember, that all classes of bondholders must receive at least what is offered to them in the plan proposed by management, and that the amount offered to each class of creditor must (in this case and almost always) respect priority of claim.
